A certain constrained vector-valued dynamic game is formulated and shown to be equivalent to a pair of multiobjective symmetric dual variational problems which have more general formulations than those studied earlier. A number of duality theorems, are established under suitable generalized convexity assumptions on the functionals. Selfduality reflecting symmetric dynamic games is investigated. The constrained vector-valued dynamic game is also regarded as equivalent to a pair of symmetric multiobjective dual variational problems with natural boundary conditions rather than fixed end points. Finally, it is indicated that our results can be considered as dynamic generalizations of those already existing in the literature.
INTRODUCTION
The applications of game-theoretic ideas are quite extensive and have recently been enjoying increased popularity in various human activities, as it provides a new perspective on optimization, networking and control problems. So the search for elegant methods for solving a general strategic game is very natural. Charnes [1] established that every matrix game is equivalent to linear programming. The results in [1] imply that every two-person, zero-sum can be solved by simplex method of linear programming. The advantage of linear programming techniques is that it provides solution to a mixed strategy game of any size. Motivated with this observation, many researchers studied equivalence between a scalar-valued game and a certain mathematical programming problem. Cottle [2] was the first to establish the equivalence between an unconstrained game having a nonlinear convex-concave payoff function and the corresponding symmetric dual programming problems. Since then several authors, notably, Chandra et al. [3] Corley [4] and Prasad and Sreenivas [5] extended partially the results of constrained scalar-valued game to a certain vector-valued game. Later Mond et al. [6] extended the results of Kawaguchi and Maruyama [7] to the nonlinear setting and proved that a constrained game is equivalent to a pair of Symmetric dual nonlinear programming problems, appearing similar to those of Mond-Weir [8] .
The dynamic games are basically concerned with the modeling of large scale systems which have independent *Address correspondence to these authors at the Department of Mathematics, Jaypee University of Engineering and Technology, Guna (M.P), India; Tel: +918305835387; Fax: +91-7544-267011; E-mails: ihusain11@yahoo.com, jainvikas13@yahoo.com decision makers with individual payoff (or reward) functions. Applications of dynamic games can be experienced in solving some important problems relating to environment resources, aerospace and energy managements. So their domain of applications is naturally wider than those of static games. In order to extend the results of Mond et al. [6] to dynamic setting involving variational problems, recently Husain and Ahmad [9] have constructed a scalarvalued game and shown it to be equivalent to pair of symmetric dual variational problems general formulations whose formulations are more general then that of [10] . They established various duality results under convexity and generalized convexity assumptions on the appropriate functionals.
The purpose of this research is to extend the results of Husain and Ahmad [9] to multiobjective setting by formulating a constrained vector-valued dynamic game and established its equivalence to a pair of multiobjective symmetric dual variational problems. For this pair of variational problems, duality results are derived under suitable generalized convexity hypotheses. A pair of selfdual multiobjective variational problems reflecting its equivalence to symmetric multiobjective dynamic game, is formulated. Finally game equivalent problems with natural boundary values are constructed and their relationship with their static counterparts [11] is indicated. In order to understand the multiobjective setting of dynamic game one may be referred to go through "Zhukovskii and Salukvadze" [12] .
FORMULATION OF VECTOR-VALUED DYNAMIC GAMES
In a game, if the process is controlled by p-players whose interested suffer from conflicts, then the objectives of an individual player cannot be expressed in terms of one index and hence results into multiobjective functions. Such specific characteristics constitute vector-valued game problems where each player wishes to optimize his own multiple criteria (pay-off function) or games with two player of which one wishes to maximize and the other wishes to minimize the same vector function. These situations provide motivation to study vector-valued constrained dynamic games.
To establish the equivalence of a constrained vectorvalued dynamic game to a pair of symmetric variational problems, we associate the vector-valued game
where 
are equivalent to the following problem (P) and(D):
Corresponding to the above variational problems (P) and (D), we have the following multiobjective variational problems:
MULTIOBJECTIVE SECOND-ORDER SYMMETRIC DUALITY
In this section, we shall prove duality relationship between the problems (VP) and (VD). For this following definitions are needed:
Consider the following multiobjective variational problem studied by Bector and Husain [13] :
Let L denote the set of all feasible solutions of ( P ), i.e.
where C(I, R n ) denote the space of piecewise smooth functions x with norm x = x + Dx , where the differentiation operator D is given by
where is a given boundary
The point x o is said to be a properly efficient solution of
An efficient solution that is not properly efficient is said to be improperly efficient. Thus for x 0 to be improperly efficient means that to every sufficiently large M > 0, there is an
L is said to be an weak minimum for P
it is also a weak minimum for P ( ) .
We shall use F and G for the sets of feasible solutions for the primal and dual multiobjective variational problems (VP) and (VD) respectively.
Theorem 1. (Weak Duality).
( ), and
inequalities (7), (11) and (12),
Using (1) and (9), we have
which, because of (A 1 ) yields
In view of
this inequality implies
From (3), (4) and (15), we have
(By integration by parts)
Using (2) and (10), we have
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Combining (17) and (18), we have
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For the validation of strong and converse duality theorems we will need to fix = in the problems (VP) and (VD) respectively and the corresponding problems will be denoted by VP ( ) and VD ( ) .
Theorem 2. (Strong duality).
Assume that the hypotheses of Theorem 1 are satisfied.
Let (C 1 ): , x(t), y(t), μ(t)
) be properly efficient for VP ( ) (C 2 ): 
, (t), r, z, (t), , (t)
The relation (19) gives,
The relation (20) implies, r ( )
From (21), we have
From (22), we have 
Multiplying (34) by (t)
T then integrating along with using (26) and (28), we have
(By integrating by parts)
Multiplying (33) by (t) ry(t) ( )and using (36) and (37), we have
Which, because of the hypothesis (C 2 ) gives
Using (38) in (33), we have
This, because of linear independence hypothesis, yields
Assume that r = 0 . Then (39) and (38) imply = 0 = z and (t) = 0,t I The relation (32) implies
which because of hypotheses (C 4 ) gives
For any M > 0 and all j satisfying
This means that
can be made arbitrary large whereas
This contradicts Theorem 1 and hence theorem is completely established.
A converse duality theorem whose proof is be similar to that of Theorem 2 is merely stated below: (H 2 ):
) is properly efficient for VP ( ) .
SELF DUALITY
A mathematical programming problem is said to be self dual, if it is formally identical with its dual, i.e. if the dual is recast in the form of primal, the new problem obtained is the same as the primal. In general the problems (VP) and (VD) are not self dual without an additional condition.
Suppose that x(t) and y(t) are of the same dimension.
The vector function t, x(t), x(t), y(t), y(t)
) is said to be skew symmetric if
f t, x(t), x(t), y(t), y(t)
for all x and y in the domain of f. That is,
It is remarked here that the study of self duality for the problems of preceding section is significant in the sense that a pair of multiobjective symmetric selfdual multiobjective variational problem represent a symmetric vector-valued dynamic game.
Theorem 4. (Self duality). Let (i)
f be skew-symmetric, 
{ }
Proof:
The problem (VD) may be re-written as minimization problem:
with skew symmetry of f, we have for t I ,
T f u t,u(t), u(t), v(t), v(t)
In view of these relations along with the hypotheses (i) and (ii), the above minimization problem takes the following form:
which is just the problem (VP). Hence (VP) is self dual.
Since u, v, , μ ( ) is properly efficient to the problem (VP) and (VD), the objective functional value are equal to This accomplishes the proof of the theorem.
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PROBLEMS WITH NATURAL BOUNDARY VALUES
It is possible to formulate a pair symmetric dual multiobjective variational problem with natural boundary values rather than fixed end points. 
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